The purpose of this article is to examine the strategic relationship between trade policy in a managed protection regime and commercial exchange at prices below normal value. It presents a three-stage model of imperfect competition that incorporates the possibility for the government authority to influence the production decisions of companies through a credible threat, by means of a specific tariff. This methodology-in a context of segmented markets, Cournot conjectures, and the application of an optimal tariff-generates a mechanism of incentives (which are not sufficient from a social welfare perspective) for domestic and foreign companies to practice reciprocal dumping. A general conclusion is that a free trade policy would be counterproductive, since it would eliminate the incentives that domestic and foreign companies would have to carry out the commercial exchange that would diminish the loss of welfare associated with the existence of monopolies in both markets.
El propósito de este artículo es el de examinar la relación estratégica que existe entre la política comercial en un régimen de protección administrada y el intercambio comercial a precios por debajo del valor normal. Presento un modelo de competencia imperfecta en tres etapas que incorpora la posibilidad de que la autoridad gubernamental influya sobre las decisiones de producción de las empresas a través una amenaza creíble, mediante el uso de un arancel específico. Esta metodología, en un contexto de mercados segmentados, conjeturas à la Cournot y la aplicación de un arancel óptimo, genera como resultado un mecanismo de incentivos -que no son suficientes desde una perspectiva de bienestar social-, para que las empresas doméstica y extranjera realicen una práctica de dumping recíproco. Una conclusión general, es que una política de libre comercio sería contraproducente, pues ésta eliminaría los incentivos que las empresas doméstica y extranjera tendrían para realizar el intercambio comercial que disminuiría la pérdida de bienestar asociada a la existencia de monopolios en ambos mercados.
Without any doubt, the Uruguay Round (UR) has been one of the cornerstones in the relatively recent development and flourishing of international trade. Trade barriers that prevailed in the post-war era were lowered following the principles of the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Agreement (GATT 47). However, new protectionist measures have recently been arising, threatening to offset the gains derived from the continuing liberalization of the international trade.
Antidumping and countervailing duties have been one of the most popular and active forms to "prevent" unfair trade practices among Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but its popularity is mainly due, inter alia, to the ambiguities of the legal procedure to find the causal link between the margin of dumping and the material injury observed and the lack of a much more formal methodology of proof of injury, which has led to several discreet interpretations. Nevertheless, in the last successful multilateral negotiation, Members of the WTO were agreed in making certain amendments and inclusions in order to implement the Antidumping Agreement as we know it nowadays
The last decade widespread use of the antidumping code among some emerging and advanced countries alike, has called the attention of several economists concerned with the effects of the antidumping duties on the international trade and the arise of just another form of the so called new protectionism.
There is a vast literature on the price-discrimination between national markets on the grounds of the unfair competitive aspects of the practice by itself, the motives to incur in this illegal practice of international trade, along with a number of variants about the effects of the price-discrimination in terms of the "softness" or "aggressiveness" of the implicit price-competition between firms and also, a number of papers that distinguish global and domestic welfare effects of practicing dumping, even reciprocally or reversely between countries
In this paper, I analyze the optimal dumping that reflects the use of administered protection through the application of optimal trade taxes to identify welfare implications of the practice of reciprocal price-discrimination between national markets, fueled by the limited credibility that the government has, providing administered protection
Following
In so doing, I propose a three-stage game: i) during the first stage, domestic and foreign firms take an entry-choice decision in its own market, ii) in the second stage, the domestic government chooses the degree of administered trade protection, and iii) during the third stage, domestic and foreign firms dump each other competing à la Cournot in the domestic and foreign markets.
In this model, the sequence of the game is crucial: it explores the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms and governments in an international trade context.
The mechanism linking the practice of reciprocal dumping and trade in this paper, is that trade provides home and foreign governments with a credible threat that motivates home and foreign firms to reciprocally dump in each other’s market. The credibility of this limited commitment relies upon the fact that both home and foreign governments have a clear incentive to protect a firm with the aim to dump in a foreign market, expecting that the protected firm will be dumped in its national market. In this context, moving from autarky to free trade would be disadvantageous as it would remove the incentives national and foreign firms have to trading each other through the unfair practice of reciprocally dumping.
Unlike
Instead of assuming that national and foreign firms produce a homogeneous good,
In Section I, I set up the model and show general results for an implicit inverse demand function. In Section II, I use a linear inverse demand function to show specific results through the three-stage game of this model where the optimal trade tax is obtained. In Section III, I extend the model to allow for a non-cooperative interaction between home and foreign governments in setting up the optimal trade tax. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
Consider a model with two open economies, home and foreign, and two identical firms. Both firms have symmetric cost structures and produce a homogeneous good. In autarky both firms act as a monopoly. Both countries trade each other, only if there is a perception of a segmented market demand in the counterpart’s market, and if there is a transport cost not too high.
The model is designed as a three-stage game. During the first stage, the domestic firm chooses to enter the market at a cost F, implicitly determining its productive capacity
In this context, both home and foreign countries are small open economies that perceive that there is a market segmentation in the counterpart’s market and face not prohibitive transport costs. As is usual, I will solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
A natural generalization of this setting is to allow for conjectural variations, even in the case where marginal costs are set to be zero with the aim to eliminate any "strategic trade" effects, and to further explore using a specific inverse parametric demand function.
During the third stage of the game, each firm believes that the other will hold its output fixed while the output level of that firm changes
For the domestic firm, and:
For the foreign firm
Where
Likewise, F stands for the fixed cost of entry, and
Naturally, for the domestic market, reaction functions are obtained directly from
With second order conditions
At this point, the question would be about the effect of the trade tax
Since
Where
Provided the Routh-Hurwitz condition for reaction function stability takes place,
The analysis in the foreign country is quite similar. I will take the second subset of reaction functions. In the foreign market these are:
With second order conditions
Totally differentiating
Since
Where
As I expected, the effect of the trade tax on the domestic exports’ market share in the foreign market is negative, whereas the effect of the trade tax on the foreign production market share is positive. In both markets, the application of trade taxes, shifts to the left the counterpart’s reaction function, reducing its counterpart’s market share.
Proposition 1: An increase in the trade tax committed by the domestic government:
Increases the domestic price of the good, Increases the domestic market share, Increases domestic profits, and Reduces foreign profits.
Proof:
a)
b)
c)
d)
Under freely managed trade and with the aim to determine the optimal trade tax for the domestic economy, I proceed to examine the consumer and producer surpluses and trade revenues. These three elements allow me to have an expression for the domestic welfare function:
First, let us obtain the sign of the optimal trade tax by obtaining
Provided:
On the producer surplus, the general expression is:
From the first order conditions for the domestic firm, I know that:
Regarding the tariff revenue, the following expression reflects the negative effect the specific trade tax has on
Naturally, there is a negative effect coming from the consumer surplus, but as long as the trade tax is not prohibitive, that effect can be more than compensated by the effect of the trade tax on the producer surplus and the tariff revenues, plus the gain in the consumer surplus as a result of the practice of reciprocal dumping, so that the optimal trade tax would be no negative:
Accordingly, the optimal
At this stage of the game, even though the government has a limited commitment, the sequence of the game -with the trade tax offered before the Cournot competition takes place-, influences firms’ behavior, so that the non-cooperative equilibrium of the domestic government favors the domestic firm.
The intuition behind this result is as if the trade tax applied by the domestic government in stage two, with the aim to protect the domestic firm, played the role of a crossed subsidy on exports of the foreign firm. In this context, there is a profit-shifting motive for intervention
Following
From the first order conditions for the domestic economy, i.e.,
By solving simultaneously
From
At this point, I naturally ask for the effects of the trade tax on the market share of the foreign country’s exports in the domestic country, and the determination of the domestic price, i.e., in looking for answers for
The intuition behind
Worth noting is that
In other words, the price elasticity of the domestic demand should be higher than
To determine the explicit solution for the optimal trade tax, I will follow the same methodology as before, i.e., totally differentiating the social welfare function in
When I substitute the optimal trade tax already obtained to have interior solutions for
Clearly,
Considering that in autarky conditions the domestic firm acts as a monopoly, the domestic firm has the following profit function:
Where
In this context, the implicit optimal dumping results from comparing the monopoly price determined by the domestic firm when the domestic country is in autarky
For its realization, the price in the dumping scenario must not be lower than the marginal plus the transport costs, condition that is guaranteed if as it has already been mentioned:
At this stage of the game, the choice to enter the market for the domestic firm will reflect the possibility to obtain positive net benefits from having administered protection in a context of reciprocal dumping, compared to a situation of autarky that may cover or not, the fixed cost of entry
However, this means that the private incentive to enter the market may not be sufficient from the social welfare point of view. To analyze this, I examine through the private domestic welfare.
Let us define
In the absence of managed trade protection, the autarky equilibrium for the domestic firm implies that the domestic firm will have the following profit
And if both countries are reciprocally dumping at each other’s market I obtain:
To finally get an explicit expression for the domestic private welfare in
If I additionally assume that both firms have symmetric cost structures with
However, from the private welfare point of view and for entry costs
In this section, actions and best responses of both domestic and foreign countries are considered in looking for the subgame perfect equilibrium at each of the stages of the game as in the analysis of the previous subsection, with just one country determining its optimal trade tax. In so doing, it is worth mentioning that the foreign firm has a symmetric cost structure and faces virtually the same incentives to dump in the domestic country. In this context, assuming that the inverse demand functions are linear in each country, the full set of reaction functions during the quantity-choice third stage game is the following:
For the domestic and foreign markets:
Solving both systems allows us to see symmetric responses in terms of the quantity choice for both domestic and foreign countries:
In the domestic market:
And in the foreign market:
The resulting market demands and price in the domestic market:
And in the foreign market:
Along with the profit functions in the domestic and foreign markets:
As is usual, by backward induction I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium in the specific-trade-tax-choice in the second stage identifying the domestic and foreign welfare functions:
Proposition 3: The global Nash equilibrium for the optimal specific trade taxes where both countries are reciprocally dumping each other, is described by positive trade taxes in both countries.
Proof: First order conditions from
The last two conditions define the home and foreign optimal policies as in the home country case alone. However, it is worth noting that home and foreign governments are only concerned about local production and that they can only influence the choice made by its representative firms through its managed trade policy, not their counterparts.
In this context, there is an additional element that deserves our attention. If there were a managed-trade-protection game between home and foreign governments, although the production choice does accrue to each firm, it is true that it also depends on the "credible commitment" both governments have to grant managed trade protection.
Therefore, even though firms’ production decisions do not depend on the action of its rival’s government, we could have a subgame perfect equilibrium where governments credible commit or not to grant managed trade protection. In that case, the subgame has the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
To formalize this, let us obtain the home and foreign welfare expressions in the context of this subgame perfect equilibrium. The following table concentrate the results when I further assume without losing of generalization that
These results clearly show that the unique equilibrium is where both firms are protected, this case generates the higher gross domestic private benefits
Proposition 4: Any trade liberalization from the optimal upper bound tariff:
Once the optimal trade tax is obtained, if that level were an upper bound from where liberalization started, it will not generate sufficient private incentives for the domestic and the foreign firms to dump in its counterpart’s market, so that the domestic and foreign firms would have a production choice as if they were in a situation of autarky. At this point, it should be clear that in this model, autarky is never an optimal choice.
To explore how private and social incentives to dump interact each other, I will compare the change in the domestic social welfare that is obtained from the practice of dumping in the context of this model i.e.,
The first term in
Where the change in the consumer surplus is the following:
Which is clearly positive for strictly positive values of the marginal cost and the transport cost
Therefore,
is clearly positive for all relevant values of
The social benefits of dumping in the counterpart’s market while being reciprocally dumped in its own market -net of private benefits-, are positive for all relevant values of marginal production and transport costs. Naturally, sunk costs represented by
This section’s main concern is about the effects of the managed trade regime on global welfare. On the one hand, it has been pointed out that there are clear incentives for the domestic and foreign firms to dump each other as long as: i) the perception of the segmented market leads to generate extra revenues from dumping in the counterpart’s market, and ii) there is a credible commitment of the government to provide administered protection preventing the price from falling below perfect-competition levels once the practice of dumping has taken place. However, for sufficiently high levels of
To obtain the expression of the world welfare we will add up the expressions for the domestic and foreign welfare in
Then substituting
Finally,
This expression is positive for all relevant values of
Like in the domestic welfare analysis, any trade liberalization from the optimal trade tax, being even and unbound tariff, will only deprive domestic and foreign firms with sufficient incentives to start trading each other.
Far beyond the theoretical treatment to the antidumping code and the application of antidumping duties, it is clear that it has been used as a relief to the import competing industries in both advanced and emerging economies. The lack of analytical formal guidelines to determine the margin of dumping, the material injury and their causality in the antidumping agreement, have led to unreliable findings to the antidumping authorities.
Nevertheless, as in the case of the antitrust system, the possibility to make the type I-error punishing the competitive behavior is very high. Fortunately, the multilateral system through the Dispute Settlement Body gives the opportunity to settle trade disputes that arise due to the application of the antidumping agreement. Although the aim of this body is to prevent trade retaliations between members, the ultimate word belongs to the countries which may misunderstood the application of the agreements.
It is important to mention that the market distortions caused by the practice of dumping in the domestic economy are very important as to counteract its effects, but the antidumping agreement should only be applied as a second-best policy due to the imperfections and the asymmetries in the international markets’ structure.
The limited commitment the domestic and foreign countries have to sustain a managed trade regime in a context of segmented markets, provide the necessary private economic incentives to build a case of international trade where the monopoly distortion is reduced with the practice of dumping. In this context, it is highly recommendable to include retaliatory costs while the practice of dumping is still seen as illegal and predatory all over the world.
The optimal trade tax provides protection to the segmented markets reducing the efficiency achieved at dumping prices. Even though the price that consumers face is higher under the managed trade regime, this price is still lower than the price realized under autarky conditions. However, there are welfare costs associated with the volume of imports of the homogeneous product: as long as the market participation of imports be positive, transport costs reduce welfare in both countries. The balance between the sources of welfare gains and losses, depend on the specific form the market demand takes place and the level of the transport cost.
1I would like to thank participants at the XXVII Coloquio Mexicano de Economía Matemática y Econometría, as well as two anonymous referees who helped improve earlier versions of this manuscript.
3The Uruguay Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay; on September of 1986, and ended in Marrakesh, Morocco; on April 1994.
4For a recent literature review on dumping, see
5For a review on this argument see Brander and
6This argument is crucial to build a case of bilateral trade where the practice of dumping takes place. Unlike
7If the fixed cost is set too high, unless the government commits to administer protection in the second stage, firms do not invest. Firms in specific sectors like steel, cement, cupper, oil, etc., are of this type.
8This means that
9The foreign firm exports to the domestic country which has an import tariff in place.
10Worth noting is that "cross effects" are weaker than "own effects" on the reduction of the marginal revenue, i.e.,
11Note that for this reason
12
13Although it is clear that
14Unlike
15Notice that if by definition
16Worth noting is that
17Both
18The domestic country is imposing a trade tax, leaving aside the "free" trade regime. That is why the foreign exports’ share "reacts" positively to an increase in the domestic trade tax. Therefore, applying a trade tax does not reduce domestic welfare.
19Notice that according to the graph, adding the gain achieved on the consumer surplus to the domestic firm’s markup, might be insufficient to compensate the cost of importing homogeneous product from abroad at
20Worth noting is that if countries are set to have a policy of free trade, there are no incentives for the firms to dump in the counterpart’s market.
21Worth noting is that:
22By assuming zero transport costs, i.e.,
23Worth noting is that the total change in the producer surplus, i.e., dPS, must be analyzed taking into account the sunk cost



